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Recent reports about cultural events coming 
from all over the world bear a strong resemblance to 
the summaries of hostilities: “Malta: Ban of theatre 
play upheld by Constitutional Court,” “Tibet: 
Banned songs by imprisoned singers translated 
to English,” “Turkey: Authorities’ persecution of 
Kurdish artists continues,” “USA: Library covers 
up controversial artwork,” “Russia: No regrets 
for Pussy Riot despite bad treatment during court 
case” (News). The frequency of such information 
and its content lead us to the state that we face 
the conflict between art and its audience with a 
trend of significant restrictions of the freedom of 
artistic expression. А particularly acute conflict 
is observed in undemocratic countries and in 
the countries with young democracies, such as 
Russia, for example. These countries lack any 
experience and/or mechanisms for monitoring 
and solving such kind of conflicts. Being guided 
by their totalitarian present or past, they hope to 
suppress the conflict by forcing repression. To 
stop the madness of war with cartoons, poems, 
and songs, they should implement a moratorium 
on the court and other punitive measures against 
art and launch new educational public programs, 
promoting contemporary art and practising free 
artistic expression. They must build a bridge 
between artists and their ethnically, religiously, 
and culturally diverse audience; otherwise we 
might risk to ruin a delicate balance between 
the freedom of speech and the freedom of 
religion, resulting in the phase out of democratic 
institutions. 
The conflict between contemporary art 
and its audience has aesthetic roots. It is a gap 
between audience’s expectations and artistic 
proposals. This gap is an aesthetic norm for any 
arts that incites the audience’s amazement. From 
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time to time an aesthetic revolution takes place; 
artists break the aesthetic norms given and the 
gap becomes wider. The audience, until they 
have not had a new assessment scale, employ 
an old one, which, nevertheless, is already 
inadequate. At such a time the appearance of a 
new artistic piece is accompanied by a wave of 
the audience’s indignation. It is exactly what 
happened to Édouard Manet’s Olympia, Pablo 
Picasso’s Avignon Girls, and the exhibition in 
Mahesh in 1962. Today old aesthetical criteria 
do not work as well. The statement that “it is 
an essential fact about art that we judge current 
samples to be art on the basis of their relations to 
our past artistic practice” (Currie, 2010, p. 238) is 
not true anymore. Artists have stepped out of the 
traditional bounds of art into an open public space 
and, betting on different forms of sensitivity, 
come into direct contact with judiciary and 
system of law. Colin Perry notes: “The treatment 
of the law as a pliable medium has long been 
at the care of political activism” and then adds 
that “in recent years, legality has also become a 
medium within contemporary art” (Perry, 2010, 
p. 6). We have a paradoxical situation when, on 
the one hand, there is a politically focused artistic 
activism with aesthetic transgression as an 
artistic method and an official response as a key 
facet of a plot’s climax; and, on the other hand, 
there is the audience who, in absence of adequate 
criteria, considers such art to be hooliganism. 
Vandalism against artistic pieces, prosecution, 
and imprisonment of artists indicate, above all, 
that a gap between the audience’s expectations 
and artistic proposals has become too wide. 
The conflict between contemporary art 
and its audience has artistic roots as well: being 
special genres of art, satire and parody have a 
particular ability to make a human’s blood boil. 
The oldest example of a political parody is the 
uncomplimentary drawing of King Tutankhamen’s 
father, which is dated 1360 B.C. The oldest 
religious satires were created by Greek masters of 
vase drawing, who mocked Gods and thus depicted 
them “pot-bellied, drop-nosed and ludicrously 
cavorting” (Keane, 2008, p. 849). Religious 
satires were also wide spread in Medieval Europe 
and Russia. Martin Luther employed the power 
of satire in his struggle against the opponents of 
his doctrine. William Hogarth, Francisco Goya, 
Honore Daumier, and other European painters 
contributed to the development of satire. But the 
golden age of satire began when first newspapers 
were issued. Newspapers’ editors brought to light 
the difference between satire of opinion and joke 
satire: the first one “has been employed frequently 
and effectively as an aid in building up resistance 
to the policies of politicians and as a weapon 
of propaganda, generally in ridicule” (Thomas 
Kemnitz, qtd. in Keane, 2008, p. 849); the last one 
has been used for entertainment and “to release 
tension by means of laughter” (W.M. Coupe 
qtd. in Keane, 2008, p. 853). At the beginning, 
satire of opinion was printed separately from 
newspapers to avoid censorship and libel laws. 
Later it was incorporated into newspapers and 
printed on the editorial page. So it gained a much 
wider audience, but “lost its scurrilous and bawdy 
character as well as most of its viciousness and 
much of its bite” (Tomas Kemnitz, qtd. in Keane, 
2008, p. 850). 
Since theological questions were translated 
into political issues, and a priest began playing “a 
role distinctly subordinate to that of the statesman 
in the moulding of human affairs” (W.M. Coupe 
qtd. in Keane, 2008, p. 853), satire of opinion 
has rather dealt with the church’s policy, than 
with its religious opponents. Vasily Perov’s 
Tea in Mytishchi, near Moscow (Chaepitie v 
Mytishchakh, bliz Moskvy), Meal (Trapeza), 
Procession on Easter (Sel’skii krestnyi khod na 
Paskhe) are examples of strict anticlerical satire 
of opinion. The cartoons Blessing of swords from 
A Woodpecker magazine (1905) and The reaction 
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fence from The Humorous Almanac (1906) are 
examples of satire against the church’s policy. 
The first satire presents a fat priest in a hood 
and a robe, carrying a candle as a main link in a 
chain of reaction. The other one depicts a priest, 
blessing a ‘patriotic rally’ on a pogrom (Leonov, 
2010). All of these satires, as well as many others, 
were likely to be offensive for religious believers; 
nevertheless, since the age of the Enlightenment 
until recent time this fact has never caused 
vandalism against satirical pictures, prosecution 
and assassination of artists. 
Only in special social and political 
circumstances the audience’s indignation 
can transform into violence and riots. This 
conclusion was made by the scientists, who 
studied the “cartoon crisis” in the Middle East. 
Several approaches emerged in the process of 
this study. The first (political) one explains the 
crisis by political manipulations on the part of 
authoritarian authorities. It cannot explain why 
most of the riots happened in the Arabic countries 
with democratic regimes. The second (religious-
&-psychological) one explains the crisis by the 
participation of image to its prototype, perceived 
by the believers, when any artistic transgression 
is perceived as a direct insult of a prophet, saint 
or God. But this theory cannot explain why the 
representatives of most non-Islamic religions do 
not react violently on ridicule and other artistic 
transgressions of their Gods. The third (moral) one 
focuses on the moral order, which is ensured by 
religious taboo, and, therefore, violation of which 
may be perceived as a threat to life. But a moral 
approach cannot explain why a riot is hopefully 
not a norm, but the believers’ extraordinary 
response to the artistic transgressive acts. The 
conception of Ron E. Hassner, a professor of the 
University of California, Berkeley, assembles 
the benefits of all three approaches. He gives an 
alternative explanation of riots “that emphasizes 
moral threat logic”, but, at the same time, takes 
political and religious factors into account as well 
(Hassner, 2011, p. 29). Ron E. Hassner has cogently 
proved that the audience’s indignation can most 
likely overgrow into a riot “where radical groups 
enjoyed the freedom to organize and protest 
the cartoons but lacked state protection of their 
sacred values” (Hassner, 2011, p. 40). 
Hassner’s theory sheds light to the event 
that took place in Russia eight years ago when 
Oleg Ianushevskii’s ‘cosmopolitan icons’ were 
vandalized presumably by the Russian nationalists 
(Article 19, 8). This theory is also valid for the 
current situation in Russia. Indeed in 2004, the 
year of the country’s political and economical 
growth and the society’s being enthusiastic over a 
fair democratic future, only mostly marginalized 
nationalist groups were consistent defenders 
of the religious orthodoxy and homespun 
traditionalism. The situation changed when 
corruption destroyed the mechanisms of legal 
protection and began to threaten the lives of 
everyone. In these circumstances a traditional 
moral order identified with religious values 
became in demand by all social groups from 
grass roots to the ruling elite, and any ambiguous 
artistic performances more and more often began 
to face incomprehension by the Russian society 
as a whole. That is what happed in the case of 
an exhibition called Forbidden Art-2006 (2007), 
where art works prohibited for exhibition in 
Moscow during 2006 were showed. The purpose 
of the exhibition, as it was defined by its curator 
Andrei Erofeev, was “to monitor and discuss the 
nature and trends of institutional censorship in 
culture” (Epstein, Vasil’ev, 2011). Alex Epstein 
and Oleg Vasil’ev, analyzing the events around 
that exhibition, point to the participation of 
not only a marginal part of the audience but 
also of the most educated and advanced one in 
the crusade against it. They cite the words by 
Oleg Orlov, a leader of the “Memorial” human 
rights organization, who blamed the exhibition 
– 582 –
Elena V. Orel. Between Belief and Law: Old-New Challenges for Contemporary Art
managers for the display of “blasphemous” art 
works and lack of any attention to the ‘true art’. 
He also called their intentions ‘ethically dubious’ 
and ‘provocative’ (Epstein, Vasil’ev, 2011). So, 
with the help of the Moscow intelligentsia the 
artists and their works were crushed by the state 
penitentiary machine. The exhibition was banned; 
Andrei Erofeev and painter Iurii Samodurov were 
prosecuted and fined. This example confirms 
that if the moral order of society as a whole is 
in danger, any transgressive artistic act will 
likely be prosecuted, and this prosecution will be 
supported by different social classes and groups. 
However, if an audience as whole sees a moral 
threat in art works, it does not mean that it is an 
artists’ guilt or art works are not “true art”; hence 
a prosecution is a form of sacrifice, that is, an 
extralegal act. 
A legal solution of the conflict contemporary 
art with its audience is complicated because it 
entails revision of the system of human freedoms 
and rights. Until now the foundation for the 
understanding of human rights was set by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
(1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR or the Covenant) (1966). 
No country has ever voted against the UDHR, 
and almost all states have ratified the covenant 
by now. Furthermore, the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (the Committee) issued series 
of General Comments on articles of the Covenant 
“to assist States Parties to the Covenant in ensuring 
that their Law and practice complies with their 
obligations under the Covenant” (Clarke, 2007, p. 
103). Nonetheless, after the series of events which 
followed the provocative works of art, such as the 
murder of Theo Van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker, 
in 2004 and the Muhammad’s cartoons crisis 
in 2005, the international discussion around 
Article 20, demanding to prohibit by law “any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement for discrimination, 
hostility or violence” (ICCPR), was stimulated 
by the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC). Since 1999 OIC has been insisting on the 
enacting of the resolution against defamation of 
religions. This question split the United Nations 
in two blocks: the block of Islamic and developing 
countries and the block of the Western opposition. 
The last one has opposed this resolution because 
of “its danger to the human rights structure”: this 
resolution basically proclaims a new right of “not 
to be offended” for the group of religious believers 
only (Graham, 2009, p. 72). That is why, when 
in 2011, under the pressure of OIC, the UNHRC 
passed a resolution called Combating Intolerance, 
Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, 
and Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and 
Violence Against Persons, Based on Religion or 
Belief the Committee issued General Comment 
34, concerning the freedoms of opinion and 
expression, which declared that “prohibitions 
of displays of lack of respect for a religion or 
other belief system, including blasphemy laws, 
are incompatible with the Covenant, except in 
the specific circumstances envisaged in article 
20, paragraph 2, of the Covenant” (General 
Comment No. 34, 48). to support a balance of 
human rights.
The domestic legislators are also under 
the pressure from both the protectors of free 
expression and the adaptors of its restriction. 
Taking into account that the arguments of the 
latter, concerning vandalism, riots, and murder, are 
weightier than the arguments of their opponents, 
it is no surprise that legislators take the side of 
the adaptors of restrictions. But “what are the 
limits?” This is the question that Ben Clarke, a 
Senior Lecturer in Law of the University of Notre 
Dame in Australia, rightly asks. He emphasizes 
the following: although the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act, does not solve but only aggravate the 
problem. The religious groups, who consider the 
criticism of religion, ideology, prophet or political 
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leader, as a threat to the moral order of life and an 
evidence of religious hatred, take such Act as a 
legitimation of restriction or even prohibition of 
any critic and controversial expression towards 
them. But any limitation of criticism in any area 
does not correspond with the principals of the 
free democratic and pluralistic society as well as 
contravene the Covenant (Clarke, 2007, pp.108-
109). Furthermore, even the freedom of religion in 
the form presumed in the Covenant is absolutely 
unacceptable for many religious groups. For 
instance, it’s unlikely that the acknowledgement 
of the Jedis (people who “have embraced Yoda, 
Luke Skywalker and the other Jedi heroes from 
the Star Wars films as spiritual role models and 
listed themselves as a religion on national census 
form”) (Clarke, 2007, p. 107) as a religious group 
will find understanding among the Orthodox 
Christians or the Muslims. So, as it follows from 
the above, enacting the law against religious 
hatred, the legislators have a great opportunity to 
fall into the trap, set by the traditional religious 
groups: when the freedom of speech is restricted, 
the freedom of religion will be the next in line. 
The restriction of freedom of artistic 
expression does harm to whom it should protect. 
So, for instance, if a parliament passes a law 
banning criticism of religious ideas or policy 
of the church because it offends the believers’ 
feelings, we will have, at least, the following 
problems: the problem of the systems of belief, 
including ideological, which advocate moral 
suppression, sexual abuse, and physical violence 
(should we criticize them?); the problem of sacred 
texts (shall we prohibit Qur’an because it denies 
Christ as God?); a problem of national and world 
art classic (shall we, for instance, ban Vasily 
Perov’s art works that are critical towards the 
Russian Orthodox Church and its priesthood?); a 
problem of the atheistic Soviet inheritance (can 
we study it?). If a parliament passes a law, which 
bans artistic remakes of visual or other religious 
patterns because they desecrate shrines, it will 
mean that a state affirms that these patterns 
participate to a divine essence, or, at least, that 
the church is a right of the holder. Should, in this 
case, amateurs and pros buy a franchise from a 
church to draw icons? As we can see, laws that 
restrict the freedom of artistic expression, in 
return, restrict the believers in their basic rights: 
the right to defend their creeds and expose false 
beliefs by ridicule and criticism as well as the 
right to freely express their religious feelings and 
views. Hence it is wise to agree with Ben Clarke’s 
proposal to view an artistic criticism of religion 
“as an opportunity to correct misunderstanding” 
(Clarke, 2007, p. 113) and seek for another way 
to fix and solve the conflict between art and its 
audience. 
Contemporary art is a challenge for justice 
as well. Each new prosecution of artists becomes 
a difficult test for the justice system to protect 
basic human rights in a contemporary pluralistic 
society. We will analyze two cases from Russian 
and American judicial practice to understand 
how this test works. We also will look for the 
answers to specific and some general questions. 
The latter ones are: Was it taken into account 
that a defendant is prosecuted for an artistic piece 
or performance? Was semantic structure of an 
artistic work analyzed or is an artist prosecuted 
for his style? Were the freedom of religion and the 
freedom of artistic expression taken into account 
seriously and equally? 
Issue: Religious sensitivity and artistic 
expression: should an artist be prosecuted if the 
audience regards his work as an insult to their 
belief?
Case 1: O’Connor, et al. v. Washburn 
University, et al. “Washburn University is a 
public institution located in Topeka, Kansas. 
Each year the University sponsors an outdoor 
sculpture contest as a means to beautify the 
campus and stimulate discussion of art and its 
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meaning. Once selected, the winning entries are 
displayed around campus for several months. One 
of the 5 winning entries for the 2003 contest was 
a sculpture by artist Jerry Boyle of Longmont, 
Colorado. Entitled Holier Than Thou, the work 
shows the upper body of a clergyman wearing a 
miter, the tall hat commonly worn by Catholic 
bishops, cardinals, and popes. Controversy 
erupted soon after the sculpture was placed on 
the Washburn campus. Critics contended that 
the clergyman was portrayed with a grotesque 
facial expression and that the ceremonial hat he 
wore resembled a phallus. The statue so greatly 
offended a Washburn professor and student that 
they filed a lawsuit in federal court demanding the 
removal of the statue. The two plaintiffs alleged 
that the statue conveyed an impermissible state-
sponsored message of disapproval of the Catholic 
faith and religion. The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals disagreed. The court concluded that 
neither the purpose nor the effect of displaying 
the sculpture was to spread an anti-Catholic 
sentiment. The court went on to say that, viewed 
in context with the other sculptures displayed 
on campus, ‘any reasonable observer... would 
understand the university had not endorsed that 
message’” (Boyle).
Case 2: The Russian Orthodox Church v. 
Pussy Riot punk group. On the 21st of February, 
2012, four young women whose faces were 
covered with masks came to the fenced part of 
the Cathedral of Christ the Savior (CCS). They 
installed the sound-amplifying equipment and 
performed a punk prayer Our Lady, chase Putin 
out. The action was recorded on video and posted 
on the blog of the Russian feminist performance 
art group Pussy Riot. The performance continued 
for about one minute until it was stopped by 
the temple’s security. Four young women were 
banished from the cathedral. Soon a court received 
the complaints from four believers who blamed 
the women for causing them an unbearable moral 
suffering. In March three participants of the 
punk prayer were detained and placed in jail. 
They were incriminated, in particular, an insult 
to the Patriarch and breach of religious taboo. 
On the 17th of August they were convicted of 
hooliganism, i.e. a gross violation of public order 
and an obvious disrespect for the society that 
was motivated by hatred and enmity to believers 
and committed by the group of persons by prior 
collusion, and sentenced to two years in prison. 
They refused to admit the guilt, saying that it 
was a political act directed against the support of 
Putin by the Patriarch.
Analysis: The Constitution of Russia, like 
the Constitution of the USA, guarantees the 
freedom of religion and the freedom of speech 
and artistic expression. The First Amendment to 
the Constitution of the USA, which prohibits the 
making of any law respecting the establishment 
of religion, impeding the free exercise of religion 
as well as abridging the freedom of speech, 
infringing the freedom of the press, emphasizes 
inviolability of these rights and freedoms and 
helps judges to work out reasonable and balanced 
solutions to controversial cases. The Russian 
justice system does not have such a support. 
On the contrary, Article 55 of the Constitution 
permits the limitation of rights and freedoms 
by the Federal Law if “it is necessary for the 
protection of the fundamental principles of the 
constitutional system, morality, health, the rights 
and lawful interests of other people, for ensuring 
the defense of the country and security of the 
State” (The Constitution). This article indicates 
the willingness of legislative authorities to 
prohibit everything that causes hot public debates 
and conflicts. Forcing judges to take the tradition 
defenders’ side against those who ridicule or 
question the existing order, this article impedes 
the restoration of justice in controvertible cases. 
The first case shows that the court rejected the 
offer to remove the statue only because somebody 
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feels offended. The court took into account that it 
dealt with a piece of art; hence a form of expression 
and an artistic message are not the same. Having 
based the investigation not on the emotions but 
facts, the court analyzed a semantic aspect of 
the statue and paid attention to the place of its 
exhibition. It reasonably concluded that an anti-
Catholic message is something that exists only in 
the heads of the offended and has nothing to do 
with the purpose of the artist and the University 
administration. Furthermore, having installed the 
statue of a Catholic clergyman in the University 
yard, the University administration showed their 
respect to this religion rather than hatred. The 
court also pointed to the exhibition’s aesthetic 
purpose – “to beautify the campus and stimulate 
the discussion of art” – as a confirmation of the 
absence of the intension to offend anybody’s 
feelings or discriminate because of religion. 
So, the first case provides us with the example 
of the case when both the freedom of religion 
and the freedom of expression were taken into 
account and protected by the court seriously and 
equally, when the complainants got explanation 
of all controversial aspects of the case, and 
arguments of the defendants were perceived with 
comprehension and trust.
In the second case the court didn’t care that 
it dealt with an artistic performance. Basing 
on the allegations of the witnesses who were 
disturbed by the breach of the Cathedral rules 
and religious taboos, the court refused to take the 
artists’ explanation of the character and purpose 
of their performance into account: it refused to 
examine the “document”, i.e. a report posted 
on the blog, which is a significant part of the 
performance as a genre of art. The court also 
ignored an artistic political message that the title 
of the prayer Our Lady, chase Putin out implies. 
The above makes it possible to assert that the 
artists were prosecuted and sentenced to two 
years in prison mostly for the style and choice of 
a place for their performance that were evaluated 
as blasphemy. The judgment is an example of an 
unequal protection of the freedom of religion at 
the expense of the freedom of speech. Virtually 
the court employed the believers’ feelings to 
suppress the freedom of speech and remove the 
problem of interpenetration of the state and the 
church from a public discussion.
As it follows the above, the Russian judicial 
practice does not take into account the nature 
of art and the necessity to maintain the balance 
of human rights and freedoms. That is why, in 
the writer’s opinion, to fix the conflict between 
contemporary art and its audience we should 
establish a moratorium on the prosecution 
of artists. If, nevertheless, legal authorities 
consider there is no other way to prevent any 
kind of hatred only via restriction of freedom of 
artistic expression, they should take into account 
a number of challenges. First, defamation laws, 
which often is employed for solving controversial 
artistic cases, can properly protect only “an 
individual’s livelihood or reputation” (Graham, 
2009, p. 76); their adaptation for protection 
of religious groups against artistic insulting 
abridges objectivity of the base evidence and, 
therefore, validity of a judgment. Second, 
application of the hooliganism law for such 
purpose leads to latent prosecution of a dissident 
opinion under the guise of prosecution of a ‘hate 
speech’. Third, special blasphemy laws have 
significant shortcomings, such as: a variable 
terminology, excess punishment, unequal 
protection, non-neutral justification. As legal 
studies show, the main problem of these laws 
are “their abridgement of free speech” (Levey, 
Modood, 2009, p. 432); they are used “to settle 
personal scores.., to suppress reformist dissent.., 
to establish theocratic regimes” (Graham, 
2009, p. 80). Anyway, before adopting any law 
for solving conflicts of contemporary art with 
its audience legislators should make a clear 
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distinction “between three types of expression: 
expression that constitutes a criminal offence; 
expression that … may justify a civil suit or 
administrative sanctions; expression that … 
raises a concern in terms of tolerance, civility 
and respect for the rights of others” (Rabat, 
p. 4) and remove artistic expression, at least, 
from jurisdiction of the criminal law. They 
also should give robust definitions of the main 
terms, such as hatred, violence, hostility, etc.; 
make sure that all restrictions of the freedom of 
expression are legal, proportional and necessary; 
examine whether a harm of restriction is less 
than a harm of ‘hate’ speech. In other words, 
they should stimulate legal studies, permanently 
update the domestic law, and take into account 
recommendations emanating from international 
papers such as Rabat Plan of Action on the 
prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence (Rabat). 
To develop a healthy debate about the role of 
religions and art in contemporary society, it is 
reasonable to abandon the blasphemy law. 
A solution to the problems caused by an 
aesthetic conflict between contemporary art 
and its audience is actually found in cultural, 
rather than legal areas. Indeed it is a general 
cultural orientation on maintaining traditions 
and classical art that turned an aesthetic gap 
into a cultural void in Russia. As for Europe and 
the USA, schools and classes of contemporary 
art are opened everywhere: students can study 
digital arts, media art, performance, activism at 
the School of the Art Institute in Chicago (SAIC), 
the University of the Arts London (UAL), 
or the Weissensee School of Art in Berlin. In 
Russia short educational programs in the area 
of contemporary art are developed only by the 
State Centre of Contemporary Art in Moscow 
and its filial branches. Russian humanities also 
make their own investment into the extension of 
the void between audience and contemporary 
art. Major scientific magazines, such as Cultural 
Studies or Questions of Art Studies, keep silent 
of the current situation with contemporary art in 
Russia; no doctoral dissertation of 2012 analyzes 
the conflict between contemporary art with 
religion, state, and judiciary system (see Ads). 
The tactic of avoidance of contemporaneity by 
shifting into history or pure science, which was 
domesticated by Russian scientists in the Soviet 
times, causes the inability of most scientists to 
relevantly evaluate and explain the contemporary 
forms. That is why to narrow the gap between 
contemporary art and its audience in Russia 
cosmetic changes are not enough. There must be 
a sizable step from the current situation towards 
the contemporaneity. The most important thing 
is to change the proportion between historical 
and contemporary parts of education in 
favor of the latter on high school and college/
university levels. State educational officials 
should also stimulate creation and promotion 
of contemporary art curricula throughout the 
state. It is reasonable to open new graduated 
programs specializing in legal protection of 
artists and art. Russian nonprofit organizations, 
social unions and funds should open free classes 
for everybody who wants to know more about 
contemporary art and acquire some basic skill 
in this area. Russian scientists together with 
their foreign colleagues should study new trends 
of contemporary culture, monitor the current 
situation with contemporary art, support and 
promote the freedom of artistic expression 
through different forms of theoretical and social 
activity.
When Samuel Huntington wrote his famous 
The Clash of Civilizations, he was not able to 
imagine that a trigger, setting the religious 
factor in motion (which is the main challenge 
for the contemporary world, according to his 
point of view), will be art. Furthermore, he did 
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not expect that, fighting against art, people will 
be extremely merciless and ruthless. It is no 
coincidence the international community gives 
so much attention to this problem. Unfortunately, 
Russia still remains out of the work that aims 
to maintain the freedom of artistic expression. 
To give the correct assessment of this position 
it would be appropriate to recall the words of 
Mr. Ole Reitov, a journalist and cultural advisor: 
“The issue of artistic freedom is crucial to any 
nation. It is not ‘just’ about the artists’ rights to 
express themselves freely, it is also a question of 
the rights of citizens to access artistic expressions 
and take part in cultural life – and thus one of 
the key issues for democracy” (qtd. in United 
Nations). These words give a clear answer to the 
question why Russian authorities should provide 
for the freedom of artistic expression and 
support our recommendations for improving the 
mutual understanding between artists and their 
audience via changes in Russian legislation and 
education.
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Между верой и законом:  
старые-новые вызовы  
современному искусству
Е.В. Орел
Уральский федеральный университет им. Б.Н. Ельцина, 
Россия 620083, Екатеринбург, ул. Мира, 19
Последнее время сообщения о культурых событиях, поступающие со всего мира и из 
России, приводят нас к выводу, что мы столкнулись лицом к лицу с конфликтом искусства 
и его аудитории, который угрожает существенным ограничением свободы творчества. В 
статье анализируются эстетические и художественные корни, политические и социальные 
обстоятельства конфликта; обобщаются данные исследований юридических аспектов 
конфликта,анализируются кейсы из сферы судебной практики, подвергается проверке 
готовность российской системы правосудия решать данный конфликт без ущерба для 
свободы творчества. В статье обосновывается необходимость объявления моратория на 
судебные и иные репрессивные меры против искусства. Авторское решение проблемы включает 
образовательные программы и научную поддержку современного искусства.
Ключевые слова: современное искусство, свобода творчества, аудитория, правосудие, 
законодательство.
